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Effects of EU Accession on the Politics of Privatization -
The Steel Sector in Comparative Perspective1 
Aleksandra Sznajder 
I. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of the European Union (EU) 
accession process on the restructuring and privatization of the steel sector of the four 
largest steel producers in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), namely Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia.2 The outcome to date for these countries' 
steel mills has been relatively uniform in that they have been integrated into the glo-
bal production networks of some of the largest multinational steel enterprises. The 
pressures which brought this outcome about, however, were far from uniform. The 
variability in the modes of convergence is highlighted by the surprising timing of the 
sales to strategic foreign investors. The countries in the forefront of the EU acces-
sion process, i.e., the Czech Republic and Poland, actually privatized their largest 
steel producers to strategic foreign investors after Romania and Slovakia.3 More-
over, in the case of the Czech Republic and Poland, the steel sector represented an 
important impediment to the closure of the competition chapter of the accession 
negotiations. The case of the steel sector thus poses three puzzles. The first is that 
the outcomes in the four countries converged despite these countries' very different 
legacies. The second puzzle is that the convergence took place in all four of them 
late in the transition process. The third, related, puzzle is that Poland and the Czech 
This paper is part of a doctoral dissertation From Behemoths to Subsidiaries - The Politics of 
Restructuring and Privatization of the Steel Sector in Central and Eastern Europe, being 
written at the Department of Political Science at Yale University. I thank Anna Grzymala-
Busse, Cezary Iwan, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Ivan Szelenyi, and Vera Trappmann for their in-
sightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I gratefully acknowledge research support of 
the Yale Center for International and Area Studies (YCIAS) Globalization and Self-Determi-
nation Grant, the YCIAS Dissertation Grant, the NSF Graduate Fellowship, as well as the 
American Council of Learned Societies Pissertation Fellowship in East European Studies. 
2 Out of the four, currently only one, namely Romania, remains as an accession country since 
the other three became Member States on May I, 2004. However, since the time span of this 
project largely pertains to the accession period rather than EU membership, the term "acce-
ssion countries" will be used to refer to all four. 
3 Slovak Republic, whose accession application to the EU was temporarily suspended in 1997, 
privatized its largest steel mill (Vychodoslovenske Zeleziame - VSZ, Kosice) in the year 2000 
by selling it to U.S. Steel. Romania, which unlike the other three countries is expected to join 
the EU only in 2007, as opposed to 2004, privatized its largest steel mill (Sidex Galati) in 
2001 by selling it to LNM Holdings. Analogous privatization decision in the Czech Republic 
(Nova Hut', Ostrava) was made in 2002 and in Poland (Polskie Huty Stali S.A.) in 2003. 
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Republic actually sold their largest steel producers to foreign investors after Slova-
kia and Romania. 
These puzzles speak directly to two literatures, which have been developing in isola-
tion from each other and have only recently started to become integrated: transition 
literature and Europeanization/EU enlargement literature.4 The transition literature 
has overwhelmingly focused on the domestic determinants of political and economic 
reform. Some of the richest analyses have been developed by scholars examining the 
effects of the different legacies of the transition countries, as well as by those taking 
a path-dependent approach, analyzing the positive feedback over time of certain ini-
tial outcomes or choices. The causal mechanisms outlined in this body of literature 
are numerous, ranging from social structural explanations to institutional argu-
ments. 5 The common denominator of these approaches is the expectation of diverse 
outcomes, be they social, political, or economic. The focus on the domestic determi-
nants of reform, however, either leaves out external pressures from analysis altoge-
ther or relegates them to the role of the dependent variable. From this viewpoint, the 
start of the EU membership negotiations itself becomes an indicator ofreform. 
The EU enlargement literature, on the other hand, has suffered from the lack of com-
parative perspective, which would take the domestic institutional and political fac-
tors into account.6 After all, domestic institutions act as filters, which determine how 
external pressures are transposed into domestic policy outcomes.7 While the acquis 
communautaire (acquis) spells out the institutional requirements of accession, the 
domestic political context of its transposition and implementation sheds much light 
on the real impact of EU accession.8 Finally, as has been argued, exclusive focus on 
Europeanization/EU effects neglects the fact that the accession countries are also si-
multaneously affected by the pressures of the International Financial Institutions 
(IFis), as well as by the pressures of global competition and financial markets.9 
Searching for an answer to the puzzles encountered in the steel sector requires the 
integration of the insights of these two bodies of literature. 10 After all, an exclusive 
focus on domestic factors leads us to expect divergent outcomes in the steel sector of 
4 Ekiert and Zielonka 2003: 7; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002: 507; Schimmelfennig 
2002: 2-5. 
5 
6 
Ekiert and Hanson 2003; Eyal et al. 1998; Kitschelt 1999; Stark and Bruszt 1998; Crawford 
and Lijphart 1997. 
See fn. 4. 
7 Garrett and Lange 1996. 
8 For an illustration in the domain of state reform, see Grzymala-Busse 2003. 
9 Ekiert and Zielonka 2003; Linden 2002. 
10 For a recent example of the way the two bodies ofliterature have been integrated in examining 
the case of the Polish steel sector, see Trappmann and Kutter 2005. 
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these countries, above all in Romania, but also in Slovakia.11 Moreover, domestic 
determinants of reform have a hard time explaining the timing of sales to strategic 
foreign investors without explicitly taking external pressures into account. On the 
other hand, the types of external pressures and the mode in which they act upon a 
given state can only be explained by considering the domestic context which triggers 
and mediates them. The research design of this paper maximizes the variation in do-
mestic variables, held as the determinants of divergent postcommunist order among 
accession states, while keeping the sectoral and EU dimension constant. In all four 
states, the steel sector holds a similarly significant place in the national economy and 
has had to adjust to the exigencies of the EU accession process. At the same time, 
these countries have had vastly different experiences under communism as well as 
exhibited significant differences in their post-1989 transition paths. 12 Consequently, 
one would expect their response to external pressures to differ. 
Let us now tum to the model of institutional change in the sector. It considers the 
interaction among domestic and external pressures in affecting the calculus of the 
decision-makers regarding retaining of the status quo or engaging in radical reform. 
The model is derived from comparative analysis of the steel sector in the four coun-
tries. Th~ analysis is based on primary materials collected as part of dissertation re-
search on the politics of the restructuring and privatization of the steel sector in the 
four countries. The materials were collected during May 2003-June 2004 and consist 
of government policy papers; numerous newspaper accounts of major restructuring 
and privatization events, including those found in enterprise-level newspapers; pu-
blications by sectoral labor union organizations and sectoral employer and industrial 
associations. In addition, materials include over ninety open-ended interviews con-
ducted with civil servants within the relevant ministries,. former ministers, European 
Commission civil servants, sectoral and enterprise-level trade union leaders, enter-
prise managers, sectoral employer and industrial association representatives, consul-
tants involved in the development of restructuring programs, as well as academics 
and journalists. 
II. Model of Institutional Change 
The model of government behavior ·and institutional change in the steel sector 
presented in this paper posits opportunistic decision-makers. While this assumption 
is shared by much of the political economy literature, here it is not an assumption 
but rather an observation resulting from fieldwork carried out in the four countries. 
11 Ekiert and Hanson 2003: 2; Kitschelt et al. 1999: 39; Eyal et al. 1998; for empirical evidence 
to support these claims, see Miklos 1997. 
12 Eyal et al. 1998; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996; Stark and Bruszt 1998; Tisma-
neanu 2003. 
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Consequently, politically costly decisions are generally delayed until a crisis situate-
ion develops. In the context of this paper, a politically costly decision is one involv-
ing radical change in the sector, intended to bring about complete restructuring, i.e., 
market viability in the medium and long term. This can either mean a state-led re-
structuring process or the sale to a strategic foreign investor. Though state-led re-
structuring is a theoretical possibility, usually the sale to a strategic foreign investor 
becomes the ultimate goal, intended to ensure enterprise prosperity by providing 
access to financial capital for investment, a direct link to world markets, as well as 
integration into global raw material supply chains. Thus, such privatization is the 
goal to the extent that it provides the means to complete the restructuring of the 
enterprise and/or the sector. 13 In order to engage in radical reform, the government 
must either be willing to do so or be unable to uphold the status quo (coercion). The 
decision to bring about radical change usually has a high political price tag attached 
to it, making the government willing to sustain the non-full-reform status quo. One 
could identify two interrelated domestic factors, which dampen the government's 
desire to engage in radical change. 
First, governments are opportunistic and want to avoid the possibility of social con-
frontation. However weak the trade unions in the individual countries, they are rela-
tively strong in the steel sector. 14 Unless accompanied by negotiated social pacts 
providing compensation for laid-off workers, radical reform steps are bound to en-
counter strong opposition, as they exacerbate the existing unemployment problem in 
heavily industrialized towns, let alone monoindustrial towns. While reform might 
benefit the country's average citizen, its benefits accrue to a diffuse majority while 
hurting a specific, well-organized, and vocal minority. Thus, rather than risking the 
possibility of conflict with dissatisfied industrial workers, the governments prefer to 
procrastinate with difficult decisions. After all, social unrest could give the govern-
ment an image of incompetence or of being a pawn in the hands of foreign interests. 
Even the negotiations of sectoral social pacts can be seen as risky by the govern-
ment, as they raise the possibility of conflict. Secondly and more importantly, the 
magic of the term "social peace" serves as a very good cover for the government's 
unwillingness to lose numerous patronage and rent-seeking opportunities. These pre-
sent an impressive range to pick from: giving lucrative positions on the enterprises' 
supervisory boards to political supporters; directly engaging in business activities 
with the enterprises by setting up intermediaries selling overpriced inputs and buy-
ing underpriced products, or being involved in barter-based trading in inter-
13 This claim derives from empirical observation. Evidence in the sector shows that privatization 
to domestic investors, including via management and employee buy-outs or debt-equity swaps 
did not lead to market viability of the steelworks and was succeeded by privatization to strate-
gic foreign investors. 
14 For arguments that labor union power is weak in CEE, see Crowley and Ost 2001; Ost 2000; 
Greskovits 1998. 
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enterprise debt, among other options. The government in power may also prefer to 
engage in partial reform by paying lip service to reform while selling the enterprise 
to political supporters and "sponsors'', or straight-out government members. Given 
these factors, one would generally expect the government to prefer the status quo of 
partial or even non-reform to full reform. Domestic political competition, which 
generally has a salutary effect on institutional development and reform design, can 
be expected to be less relevant in this case, lesser still, the more veiled the patronage 
that takes place. 15 Status quo which is not associated with blatant corruption and 
clientelism by the party/coalition in power makes it more difficult for the chal-
lengers to run on a platform of radical reform if that reform is expected to entail 
severe social consequences. While the government in power might not be willing to 
engage in additional reform, it can only retain the status quo if it is also able to with-
stand a combination of domestic market pressures and external pressures for reform. 
These, as well as the factors influencing the government's willingness to sustain the 
status quo, are shown in Figure 1 below. Domestic market pressures are by them-
selves considered to be the weakest constraint, subject to political vagaries and 
lobbying. At the same time, one would expect that the higher the level of market in-
stitutionalization within a given country, the greater the coercive ability of domestic 
economic.pressures in bringing about full reform. 
Figure 1. Determinants of Sustainability of No/Partial Reform 
Status Quo 
Willingness to sustain SQ + 
• Political opportunism 
• Patronage and rent-seeking 
opportunities 
Ability to withstand: 
Domestic market pressures .,.. ___ , 
Globalization pressures 
t International market (bottom-up) Institutional/IFI 
(top-down) 
EU Accession pressures 
( top-down-7 bottom-up) -----J 
15 On the benefits of political competition for state reform in CEE, see Grzymala-Busse 2003a. 
On the positive effects of democratic policy alternation on economic reform in CEE, see Oren-
stein 2001. 
213 
Restrukturierung 
The domestic market pressures can either result from endogenous pursuit of reform 
or be a consequence of the internalization of EU norms.16 Irrespective of the prove-
nance of these pressures, the key point is that they can function without explicit ex-
ternal enforcement. External pressures can be divided into the broad categories of 
globalization and Europeanization/EU accession pressures. Globalization pressures 
consist of two subcategories, the first one representing bottom-up, international mar-
ket pressures, especially those of the financial markets, and the second one institu-
tional, or top-down pressures. Different circumstances determine the degree to 
which these pressures become salient. If a given enterprise is an active participant in 
the international capital market, it takes on the obligations of this participation, in-
cluding any debt repayment. Thus, should such an enterprise become unable to re-
pay its debts, it can either rely on the state for bailouts or face bankruptcy. 17 On the 
other hand, the top-down institutional pressures of the IFis become salient in situa-
tions when the government is unable to ensure macroeconomic stability. 
Globalization pressures are inherently related to the country's state capacity. In addi-
tion to the government's ability to make decisions intended to foster reform, state 
capacity also requires a relatively competent state administrative apparatus to imple-
ment these decisions. A state which is more capable of internally generating finance 
for the enterprises' use, also shields them from the bottom-up global market pressu-
res. At the same time, using the mediation of domestic market institutions, the state 
must be capable of exerting enough pressure on the enterprises to carry out market 
adjustment, i.e., restructuring. Otherwise, it risks frequent demands for bailouts and 
subsidies. Should the state fail in this task and yield to enterprise pressures, it could 
face unsustainable deficits, leading to fiscal crises. These could eventually trigger 
IFI involvement and top-down pressures for radical reform. In states with enough 
capacity to avert IFI involvement, there nonetheless exists the danger of partial re-
form equilibrium.18 Thus, while there might be enough restructuring taking place so 
as to prevent IFI involvement, the restructuring may still be incomplete and, as a re-
sult, threaten the enterprise's long and even medium-term survival. Rather than 
overseeing thorough restructuring, the state apparatus would repeatedly mediate bet-
ween creditors and the debtor enterprise, leading to a series of partial, short-term 
adjustments. 19 
16 For example, if a given enterprise is performing badly, domestic economic pressures would 
make the threat of bankruptcy credible, leading to radical reform of the enterprise, either by 
state involvement in the restructuring of the enterprise or through a sale to investors capable of 
undertaking the restructuring task. 
17 It should be kept in mind that the option of bailing the enterprise out becomes severely restric-
ted once the EU competition policy rules become binding. 
18 For the original idea of"partial reform equilibrium," see Hellman 1998. 
19 For a discussion concerning the positive role of the state as a mediator among debtors and cre-
ditors, see McDermott 2003. 
214 
The Steel Sector 
While the existence of partial reform equilibrium might suffice to block top-down 
globalization pressures, and possibly even international market pressures, it is chal-
lenged by EU accession pressure. The latter acts in a vise-like manner, where the 
initial top-down processes spur bottom-up domestic market pressures for enterprise 
adjustment. The liberalization of trade as well as the creation of functioning regula-
tory institutions, most notably the competition authority, increase the role of market 
pressures by severely limiting the opportunities for ad hoc state intervention in the 
economic processes. At the same time, however, these also enhance state autonomy 
vis-a-vis powerful interests. In the case of the steel sector, as will be discussed sub-
sequently, the EU requirements are particularly stringent. Where the domestic mar-
ket pressures do not suffice to bring about radical reform, and where the state is 
capable of inducing only partial market adjustment while not triggering external 
market or IFI pressures, the EU can pull the last lever of coercion to induce full 
reform: prohibition of state aid following accession. 
III. EU Effects 
As the framework presented in section II anticipates, even though the EU require-
ments have been the same for all accession states, the salience of the EU coercive 
pressures in the steel sector has varied. It is a function of the domestic context of the 
countries concerned, most notably, of their state capacity and earlier reform paths, 
including the degree of dependence on the international financial markets· and exter-
nal IFI financing. Let us now tum to the steel sector acquis, placing it in a historical 
context. 
The developments in the steel sector underscore the differences in bargaining power 
between the EU and the applicant states.20 One of the criticisms of the current enlar-
gement process is that the acquis developed as a result of bargains and compromises 
struck among older Member States and might not be the appropriate solution to the 
accession states' needs and problems.21 The case of the steel sector goes even fur-
ther. It illustrates that the insistence on strict application of the steel sector acquis in 
the accession states stands in stark contrast to the way the acquis had been twisted 
and bent so as to fit the needs and shortcomings of the older Member States. The 
evolution of the acquis reflected substantial malleability on the part of the Commis-
sion in adapting the preexisting acquis to Member State requests, as it granted per-
mission for state largesse in restructuring the ailing western European steel industry. 
In the context of the 1980 crisis in the steel market, the need for financial support for 
the sector was cloaked in the language of creating Community sectoral policy, even 
20 Vachudova 2000; Grabbe 2001. 
21 Cameron 2003. 
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as the Commission stressed that the Community lacked the funds necessary to 
finance restructuring. Therefore, the Member States were allowed to administer aid, 
provided it met the newly established critera. The scope of admissible aid was wide, 
encompassing investment, expenses arising from closures, continued operation, and 
emergency rescue. The proposed aid was supposed, nonetheless, to be part of a re-
structuring program and subject to Commission approval. For the following twenty 
years, much longer than originally anticipated, the rules permitting state aid, albeit 
much more restricted, stayed in place.22 After July 22, 2002, to coincide with the 
expiry of the ECSC Treaty, no more state aid could be obtained by the EU steel-
makers. 23 The evolution of state aid acquis in the steel sector puts in perspective the 
enormous challenge which the accession states faced in meeting the EU require-
ments. It hardly needs emphasizing that the steel sector in the CEECs started from 
very different initial conditions, having had to make the leap from being the darling 
of a centrally-planned economy to operating in a competitive market system. Re-
structuring comprised far-reaching employment, organizational, technological, and 
financial elements. 
The EU had been very clear with the applicant states as to the steel sector-related 
membership requirements. The key issues of concern were production capacity and 
state aid. The two were linked in that retaining unused production capacity lowered 
the already low profit margin in the sector, making the enterprises unable to operate 
without direct or indirect state aid. Protocol 2 of the Europe Agreements, negotiated 
with the CEECs in the early 1990s, laid out the criteria for granting state aid to the 
sector. The countries could exceptionally grant public aid for restructuring purposes, 
provided that it met the following conditions: it led to the viability of the benefiting 
firms under normal market conditions at the end of the restructuring period; the 
amount and intensity of such aid were strictly limited to what was absolutely 
necessary in order to restore viability and were progressively reduced; the attendant 
restructuring program was linked to a global rationalizing and reduction of capacity 
in the countries concemed.24 Such aid could last for only five years, thus in the case 
of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia until the end of 1996 and in the case of 
Romania, until the end of 1997. The grace period could be prolonged until the date 
of accession only if a "credible and realistic" restructuring program was approved by 
22 For a history of the steel-related acquis see the following: Commission Decision No 2794/80/-
ECSC; Commission Decision No 257/80/ECSC; Official Journal L 029, 06/02/1980; Commi-
ssion Decision No 2320/81/ECSC; Commission Decision No 3484/85/ECSC; Commision 
Decision No 322/89/ECSC; Commission Decision 3855/91/ECSC; Commision Decision No 
2496/96/ECSC. See also: Judgment of the European Court of Justice (Second Chamber) of 15 
December 1994. Societa Finanziaria Siderurgica Finsider SpA (in liquidation) v Commission 
of the European Communities. Case C-320/92. 
23 Commission Decision No 2496/96/ECSC. 
24 Protocol II of the Europe Agreement (e.g., Article 9, paragraph 4 of Europe Agreement 
between the EEC and Romania). 
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the Commission.25 State aid became a salient issue around 1998, when the difficult 
situation on the world markets revealed the inadequacy of the restructuring measures 
undertaken to date and the scope of the enormous task remaining before accession. 
To the Commission's dismay, not only restructuring-related, but also operating aid 
was being granted in a legal vacuum.26 The negotiations in the steel sector were 
being closely followed by the Member States and by the steel lobby. According to 
an interviewed Commission civil servant, in the case of the competition chapter 
negotiations, "there were constant inquiries from the Member States." The usually 
formalistic Commission reports to the Council on the progress of negotiations this 
time sparked "real discussions in the Council prior to the closure of the negotia-
tions.'.27 The extent of Member States' interest in public aid granted to the accession 
countries' steel sector was also reflected by the written parliamentary questions sub-
mitted by Members of the European Parliament of all political stripes.28 The require-
ments of EU accession influenced change in the sector by putting in motion top-
down and bottom-up market adjustment pressures. On the one hand, state monito-
ring of the economic processes was to be strengthened through rational institutiona-
lization, most notably through the creation of an apolitical competition authority, 
answerable to the Commission. Moreover, the state administrative apparatus was to 
exert eno11gh control over enterprise managers to exact an acceptable restructuring 
plan and oversee its implementation.29 On the other hand, the purpose of state invol-
vement was to ensure the success of its own retrenchment. Thus, the EU was foste-
ring the emergence of a regulatory state.30 While the acquis was the same for all 
applicants, paradoxically only in the case of the transition "leaders," namely Poland 
and the Czech Republic, was the EU directly responsible for the process of radical 
transformation in the sector. As the following case studies illustrate, in the cases of 
Slovakia and Romania, EU coercive pressures were preempted by the bottom-up and 
top-down processes of globalization, buttressed by domestic political change. 
25 European Commission 2000. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Interview with a Commission civil servant in the Commission Delegation to the Czech 
Republic, Prague, November, 2003. 
28 See, as examples, written questions to the Commission by Glenys Kinnock of PSE (Party of Eu-
ropean Socialists Group) as well as by Giles Chichester of PPE-DE (Group of the European 
People's Party (Christian Democrats) am;! European Democrats) in 2002. Glenys Kinnock inqui-
red about the impact of enlargement on the EU's steel industry, asking the Commission to agree 
that "there must be full transparency on past subsidies," that "after the competition chapter has 
been closed for each country, the Commission must agree that the applicable state aid acquis will 
be applied in full," and finally, that "all state aid must end on accession." Official Journal 011 E, 
15/0112004 P.0045-0045. Giles Chichester took a keen interest in the Romanian steel sector 
privatization, asking whether "all disclosure requirements have been fulfilled" in the course of 
the privatization ofSidex. Official Journal 301 E, 05/12/2002 P. 0068-0068. 
29 The Commission also took upon itself the same task of monitoring the implementation of the 
restructuring plan. 
30 Majone 1996. 
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IV. Steel sector: country case studies 
Slovakia - VSZ - U.S. Steel Kos ice 
Since it began operating in 1965, Vychodoslovenske Zeleziarne (VSZ) has become 
the most important Slovak enterprise, and was the flagship of the communist Indus-
trialization project. Specializing in flat products having higher value added than the 
long and semi-finished products, the mill had quite promising prospects in the post-
communist era.31 In the 1990s, it was responsible for the production of about 10% of 
Slovak GDP, 11 % of its exports and for 25% of foreign currency inflow.32 It em-
ployed over 20,000 people and was indirectly responsible for about 100,000 work-
places. Because the majority of its shares were sold during the first wave of voucher 
privatization, the VSZ ownership structure was highly atomized. In March 1994, 
three days after the parliamentary no-confidence vote in the first MeCiar government 
in independent Slovakia, a brand new company, formed by members of the manage-
ment closely connected to the MeCiar government, bought 9.52% shares of VSZ 
from the National Property Fund (FNM). It bought the shares at about 20% of their 
book value.33 Alexander Rezes emerged as the key figure, later becoming the minis-
ter of Transportation, Postal Services and Telecommunication. After MeCiar's 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) won the subsequent parliamentary 
elections, FNM sold another 15% ofVSZ shares to a Rezes-allied firm. It also sold 
10% of the shares to Hutnik, a firm controlled by the enterprise-level trade union, 
also allied with Rezes, all at the same 20% fraction of the book value.34 The enter-
prise remained profitable for the time being, but was quickly falling prey to elabo-
rate schemes of "tunneling" or asset-stripping. These included the use of intermedia-
ries for purchasing overpriced inputs and selling underpriced final products, as well 
as similar transactions carried out with hundreds ofVSZ subsidiaries.35 VSZ also be-
came an exemplar of managerial empire-building, with an appetite for becoming a 
31 Flat products (e.g., sheet metal) can be used to make consumer goods such as household ap-
pliances, which are much sought-after in a transition economy. Their value added is higher 
than that of semi-finished or long products (such as rails, wire, or sections). The demand for 
long products has been decreasing, in part due to decline in heavy industry. 
32 Hutnan 1999a; Marcincin 2000: 329. 
33 The shares were sold to Manager, s.r.o., a firm Rezes controlled. See: Hutnan 1999a. 
34 One should add that the enterprise-level trade union later split from the sectoral-level trade 
union, OZ KOVO, to form its own organization, Metalurg, and remained loyal to Meciar and 
his associates until the end, unlike OZ KOVO, which supported the opposition in the 1998 
elections. Source: Interviews with Metalurg and OZ KOVO leadership, Bratislava and Kosice, 
April 2004; Hutnan 1999b; numerous press reports in Trend, Hospodarske Noviny, Ocel' 
Vychodu, Priority. 
35 Most of the intermediaries were closely tied to the managers. The most notorious was Barkos, 
registered in the Cayman Islands, which had exclusive rights to distribute VSZ products in 
North America. See: Hospodarske Noviny 1997. 
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transnational enterprise.36 In 1996 and 1997 it created joint ventures with Finnish 
and U.S. steelmaking companies. In the meantime, it also became a precocious parti-
cipant in the world financial markets. In 1995, it took out a $35mln loan from 
Merrill Lynch and in 1996 it obtained a hefty loan of $125m, syndicated by ING 
Bank N.V. The conditions of the loans stipulated that the lenders could require loan 
repayment before the specified due date. This status quo benefited the government 
in power and the managers-cum-owners (including the trade union leaders), tightly 
bound by clientelistic relations. In 1998, for example, Alexander Rezes managed the 
parliamentary elections campaign for the HZDS while his inexperienced son became 
the president of VSZ. When VSZ encountered financial problems, the government 
turned a blind eye to tax arrears.37 
The managerial bonanza ended in 1998, as the enterprise's growing financial diffi-
culties, along with the abuses made known over the course of the 1998 campaign, 
led the foreign banks to demand an early loan repayment. Since VSZ was unable to 
repay, the foreign lenders declared cross-default and the enterprise found itself on 
the brink of bankruptcy. The new government, elected on a radical reform platform, 
was unwilling to protect a management with close ties to its political adversary. Nor, 
given the.dire financial situation of the Slovak treasury following MeCiar's rule, was 
it able to bail out the enterprise. At the same time, it was keen to avert the social, 
political, and economic catastrophe, which would follow the bankruptcy and 
possible liquidation of VSZ. The new government became involved in resolving the 
crisis, as a foreign bank-approved crisis manager was elected by the shareholders to 
succeed Julius Rezes et al., who resigned from their posts. The task of Gabriel Eich-
ler, the new president, was to resolve the debt repayment issue with the banks by 
convincing them that the enterprise was viable and that they would obtain much 
higher returns if they waited for the results of restructuring, rather than pressed for 
bankruptcy. He also started to prepare the enterprise for its subsequent sale to a stra-
tegic investor who would ensure its long-term stability and development, in part by 
taking over its debts.38 Despite numerous obstacles from sympathizers of the old ma-
nagement as well as proponents of domestic capitalism, Eichler along with the Slo-
vak government representatives managed to negotiate a mutually, satisfactory deal 
with U.S. Steel.39 One should highlight that the Slovak government exerted extra-
36 Entities purchased included sports clubs; such as the most prestigious Czech football club, AC 
Sparta Praha, but also a Hungarian steelmaker which subsequently faced bankruptcy, Di6sgyor 
Steelworks. 
3 7 Marcicin 2000, p.333. 
38 Profit 2000. 
39 The final agreement with U.S. Steel stipulated that U.S. Steel pay $60m up front, assume debts 
of $325, pay $15m in tax arrears, and pay shareholders $25-$75 by 2003, as well as invest a 
minimum of $700m over the following 5-10 years. Critically for the region, the new enter-
prise, U.S. Steel Kosice, would retain full employment, with employment reduction taking 
place via natural attrition. See: U.S. Steel memo; SME 2000. In exchange, the buyer would 
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ordinary organizational effort, at times on the borderline of legality, in order to 
obtain a controlling stake in the enterprise prior to sealing the deal. 
Summing up, in the case of VSZ, the bottom-up pressure of global financial actors 
who became the enterprise's lenders represented the primary mechanism through 
which the outcome of majority ownership by a strategic foreign investor was obtai-
ned. By contrast, the EU role was marginal.40 It became prominent only after the fi-
nal privatization deal. In 2004, a disagreement ensued between the Commission and 
the Slovak government, along with the U.S. Steel Kosice management, over the 
interpretation of the agreed-upon production limits appearing in the Act of Acces-
sion. 41 A high-profile disagreement ensued after the Commission argued for an ear-
lier date of the agreement's validity than had been interpreted by U.S. Steel. In the 
end, bringing tangible relief to the Slovak government, U.S. Steel agreed to have the 
total amount of state aid reduced by $70m.42 The controversy revealed just how 
closely the EU was following all state aid disbursed to its competitors from the 
accession states. 
Romania - Sidex Galati - Mittal Steel Galati 
Formerly known as Sidex Galati, Mittal Steel Galati, is the largest Romanian steel 
mill, accounting for 4% of Romanian GDP and similarly to VSZ, a flat product 
producer, as well as a major symbol of Romania's national communism.43 Privatiza-
tion did not figure prominently on the Romanian government's agenda. While the 
initial talk of privatizing the plant started around 1996, the enterprise remained in 
state hands, with only 13% of the shares privatized through the 1996 mass privati-
zation program. Even though the enterprise did not create subsidiaries, it was encirc-
led by hundreds of asset-stripping 'tick companies,' intermediating the enterprise's 
purchases and sales operations and benefiting the management as well as the local 
politicians of all major parties.44 The plant developed a close relationship with the 
profit from tax holidays until the end of 2009, originally unlimited, but as a result of Acce-
ssion Treaty negotiations, reduced to $500 min. See also: Huttlan 16 September 1999. 
40 Interviews with state actors directly involved in the privatization process or close observers 
thereof, Bratislava, April 2004. 
41 The wording of competition policy provision of Annex XIV of Slovakia's Act of Accession, 
which placed caps on U.S. Steel's caps on production and sales, gave rise to "good faith mis-
understanding" as to whether the provisions concerning 3% production caps were valid as of 1 
January 2002 or as of accession. 
42 Kosicky Korzar 2004; Act of Accession: Slovakia, p. 918. 
43 The sector was central to the feud between Khrushchev and Gheorghiu-Dej over Romania's 
role in the CMEA. 
44 Shortly before privatization, the Romanian Prime Minister estimated the number of these 
firms at around 1,400. See: Economist Intelligence Unit, 31 August 2001; Numerous inter-
views in Romania, May-June 2004. 
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communist successor party leadership and similarly to the Slovak case, the plant-le-
vel trade union split from the sectoral-level organization, Metarom, early in the 
transition process. As a result, it enjoyed direct access to the government. 
The deterioration of Sidex's financial situation coincided with Romania's macroeco-
nomic instability. With weak domestic market pressures for adjustment, Sidex's ma-
jor creditors became the Romanian state, utility companies and other state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). The enterprise registered arrears in tax and social security fund 
contributions, as well as non-payment of utility bills and other debts to the tune of 
$360m. At the same time, the country's volatile macroeconomic situation in 1999 
triggered more intensive IFI involvement. In addition to negotiating yet another 
stand-by agreement with the IMF, the Romanian government signed the PSAL I 
program with the World Bank (WB), intended, among others, to speed up privatiza-
tion of the most problematic SOEs.45 Sidex certainly topped the list, as in 2000 it 
was responsible for 80% of the losses to the Romanian state budget. The govern-
ment at the time was a difficult coalition of center-right parties, which won the 1996 
elections on a platform of speeding up the reform process. Plagued by corruption it 
had earlier promised to curb and by the often incompetent handling of reforms, in-
cluding privatization, the government found itself under a variety of pressures. On 
the one hand, it faced much opposition to the privatization of Sidex from the bene-
ficiaries of the status quo, including the management and the trade unions represen-
ting a 27,000-strong workforce.46 On the other, it came under several external pres-
sures, emphasizing different elements of the privatization and restructuring process, 
which sometimes worked at cross-purposes.47 
The IFis insisted on quick privatization. Some state representatives highlighted the 
extent to which their hands were tied, with the chairman of the State Ownership 
Fund (SOF) claiming that "Sidex cannot wait longer without the money the Govern-
ment can no longer provide."48 The only solution to the problem was seen in a quick 
sale to a strategic foreign investor. A successful privatization; however, required the 
restructuring of the huge accumulated debt, i.e., it would have had to entail state aid. 
According to the criteria of the Association Agreement with the EU, this could only 
be granted following EU's approval of the sectoral restructuring plan.49 Seeing that 
45 Other areas included the reform of the banking sector; social security refrom; and promotion of the 
business environment. See: Mediafax 2000c; interviews at the AV AS, Bucharest, May 2004. 
46 Some of the union worries seemed substantiated considering the failures of the privatization 
process to non-strategic foreign investors (usually involving leveraged buy-outs) in several 
smaller steel mills such as CS Re~ita, Qtelu Ro~u, or Tepro Ia~i. 
47 The differences in emphasis were skillfully exploited by the different elements of the state 
apparatus. 
48 Mediafax 2000a. 
49 Letter from Enrico Grillo Pasquarelli (European Commission) to Petru lane (responsible for 
the preparation of the steel sector restructuring program at the Ministry of Economy and 
Trade), dated 20 January 2000, on file with the author. 
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the government was planning a quick privatization, the EU insisted on the plan's ra-
pid development. 50 Renouncing proposed sectoral restructuring alternatives, the go-
vernment chose to pursue the individual sales route, but with the upcoming elec-
tions, it seemed reluctant to start the actual privatization process. It took a significant 
step in that direction, however, by signing a contract with an investment bank for 
privatization consulting and by making the official announcement for privatization 
bids about two weeks before the elections. 
The communist successor Social Democratic Party (PSD) emerged as the winner of 
the 2000 elections.51 Its first challenge was its historical baggage, as it was associ-
ated with the slow pace of reforms during the 1990-1996 period. Its second challen-
ge was keeping to the accession schedule. The new government thus had to show its 
reformist zeal if it was to gain credibility in the eyes of its western partners. Stop-
ping the privatization of Sidex would have sent a very negative signal to the interna-
tional community just when the government was attempting to establish its reputa-
tion as a reformer. At the same time, no other solution seemed feasible, given the 
scope of the already described financial problems Sidex generated. In addition, the 
endorsements of the IMF and the WB were considered necessary for the successful 
conclusion of the membership negotiations with the EU.52 On July 24, 2001, the 
government signed a privatization contract worth $500m with LNM Holdings, the 
fourth-largest world steel producer at the time.53 Simultaneously, the Romanian 
government continued to negotiate with the EU the restructuring program necessary 
for closing the competition policy chapter.54 
50 After the development of a sectoral restructuring plan by Usinor Consultants in 2000, financed 
by PHARE funds, the Ministry of Industry and Trade along with the sectoral trade union and 
employers' organizations insisted on implementing its recommendations. These included halt-
ing the privatization process and restructuring the enterprises prior to selling them. This statist 
approach was quickly renounced by the privatization authority and the IFis. The European 
Commission negotiators also distanced themselves from these recommendations, insisting 
nonetheless that the government had to develop a restructuring plan. See: Mediafax 2000b. 
51 The Party of Social Democracy of Romania (PSDR) actually won plurality of the votes in the 
2000 elections. It subsequently merged with the Romanian Social Democratic Party (RSDP) to 
form the Social Democratic Party (PSD). 
52 These had to give the green light for Romania to be considered a fully functioning market eco-
nomy. 
53 The contract entailed LNM's purchase of shares for $52m, $35lm investment in the first de-
cade and $1 OOm in working capital. A debt-equity swap was to clear half of the debt, giving 
LNM 90% of equity, with the rest of the debt (out of$ l .2b total) written off. See: Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 3 August 2001. 
54 The initial program, adopted as law in 2002, was not approved by the EU and was followed by 
another law in 2004, which served as the basis for successful conclusion of the accession ne-
gotiations. See: Hotiirarea Guvernului Romaniei nr. 213 din 28 februarie 2002 and Hotiirarea 
Guvernului Romaniei nr. 655 din 29 avril 2004, respectively. 
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Summing up, while the EU was closely involved in the restructuring of the steel sec-
tor undertaken by the Romanian government, the decision to privatize Sidex was 
overwhelmingly made under the influence of the !Fis. These pressured the Roma-
nian government to attain macroeconomic stability by getting rid of loss-making 
firms. This pressure coincided with a more cohesive coalition coming to power, 
eager to establish its reformist reputation.ss 
Czech Republic - Nova Hut' - Mittal Steel Ostrava 
Commissioned in 1952, the Czech Republic's largest steel producer, Nova Hut' 
(NH), was also a darling of the communist system. Its dominance of the Czech steel 
sector was shared with two older North Moravian firms, Ti'inecke Zelezarny (TZ) 
and Vitkovice (VS). The privatization ofTZ represented one of the few economical-
ly successful, significant leveraged buy-outs to domestic investors.s6 At the same 
time, the government's efforts to bring about VS and NH restructuring through man-
agement buy-outs, begun in 1996 under the leadership of Vaclav Klaus, failed. The 
subsequent center-left government, led by the Czech Social Democratic Party, be-
came involved in the successful restructuring of VS, which is currently in the pro-
cess of being privatized to foreign investors. The final decision concerning the pri-
vatization of NH shared a similar element with the Slovak case, namely, it was in 
part made under strong pressure of international capital market lenders, specifically 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Unlike the Slovak case, however, the 
timing of the decision was determined by the EU pressures to close the competition 
chapter. 
NH's engagement with the international financial markets began in 1994, when the 
government approved its plan to construct a mini-mill for the production of thin pla-
tes and promised support in obtaining a loan from foreign lenders. Rather than un-
derwriting the loan, the government arranged for a $250m loan from the financial 
arm of the World Bank, the IFC. s7 Since the IFC could only lend to private entities, 
the government artificially lowered its stake in the company to 49%.s8 In 1998-1999, 
55 The decision to privatize was duly noted by the European Commission civil servants, who per-
ceived the sale as a "huge achievement'' by the government, which "has been clear as to the 
goals and desire to bring about change" (Interview with the European Commission desk offi-
cer responsible for Romania, Brussels, May 2002). 
56 The privatization of TZ, however, had significant political consequences, as a party financing 
scandal surrounding TZ privatization eventually contributed to the downfall of the Klaus 
government in 1997. 
57 This sum includes interest accumulated as of2001, Para) and Sperkerova 2001. 
58 The government transferred enough of its shares to Credit Swiss First Boston (CSFB) so as to 
reduce its share to 49%. CSFB was then supposed to try to sell the shares to other entities. 
Should it have failed to do so, which is what eventually happened, the Czech government had 
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however, NH found itself in a particularly difficult financial situation. For technolo-
gical reasons, the new investment was not performing as expected and the delay in 
commissioning led to substantial losses. The IFC then started to exert pressure on 
the Czech government, relying also on the World Bank for support, in order to gua-
rantee the repayment of the plant's loan.59 NH's financial difficulties were exacer-
bated by a barter-type contract signed with one of its major suppliers. In exchange 
for lenient treatment of the enterprise's debt, the contract stipulated overpriced pro-
duction inputs and underpriced final products.60 As the steel enterprises' market po-
sition deteriorated, state officials realized that the sector was in desperate need of 
state aid and that they needed the EU's approval of the sectoral restructuring plan in 
order to disburse the aid lawfully.61 At that point, a protracted negotiation process 
with the EU ensued. After the EU rejected the 1999 restructuring plan proposal for 
meeting the accession requirements, it provided PHARE program funds to finance 
another study, carried out by the London-based Eurostrategy consultants. The latter 
recommended the option of sectoral consolidation under the leadership of the priva-
tized TZ. NH and VS were supposed to be sold to TZ for a symbolic crown, with TZ 
leading the -restructuring process, using 28b Kc of state aid.62 The resulting consoli-
dated Czech Steel Company would subsequently seek an international strategic in-
vestor. The idea raised much opposition within the domestic steel community.63 The 
IFC also protested strongly against it, perceiving that it would jeopardize NH's loan 
repayment prospects. 
The government thus found itself under a variety of pressures: managerial, IFC, and 
EU. The latter intensified as the deadline for closing the competition chapter nego-
tiations loomed. With time running out, the EU became increasingly impatient with 
committed itself to reacquiring the shares form CSFB. The IFC was of course fully aware of 
the illusory nature ofNH's privatization. 
59 Interview with Jan Mladek, former deputy minister of finance, responsible for negotiations 
with the IFC and the IFis at the time, Prague, December 2003; According to an interview with 
the FNM Chairman during 2000-2002, in his discussions with the IFC representatives, the lat-
ter argued "you have a substantial stake in the company, so it is like an invisible guarantee" 
(Interview with Jifi Havel, former FNM chairman, March 2004). 
60 Interview with Havel. Also, the supplier enterprise seemed to be closely tied to the Social De-
mocratic government in power: Kopecky 2003; Respekt 2001. 
61 According to interviews at both the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade, as well as with the 
Czech managers, the fact that the December 1996 deadline was approaching was overlooked. 
62 Para) and Sperkerova 2001. 
63 Skeptics raised doubts over TZ's competence to lead the complex restructuring process and 
over the subsequent possibility of selling the steel giant. There was also extraordinary opposi-
tion of the managers and trade unions of NH and VS against becoming dominated by TZ's 
management, which still had the privatization stigma attached to it. Interview with Roland 
Berger Strategy Consultants, Prague, March 2004; Interviews with the management of two 
North Moravian steel enterprises, March and April 2004; Kubatova 2001; Novakova and 
Gallistl 2001. 
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the government's indecision as the government tried to come up with a satisfactory 
solution while avoiding immediate privatization to foreign investors. Its subsequent 
proposal envisioned a merger of NH with VS, this time using Osinek, a subsidiary of 
the National Property Fund (FNM), as the coordinating enterprise.64 The proposal 
satisfied neither the IFC nor the EU, which claimed that the means committed for 
the purpose would not ensure full restructuring. The EU's impatience was reflected 
by the Commission negotiator's statement: "This is your problem. If you want to 
solve it, you better get cracking, and there are several ways to solve it, but time is 
running very short .. .Ifyou don't make up your mind over the next few weeks, it will 
be too late."65 A convenient solution appeared when LNM, known for privatizing 
Sidex in Romania, expressed its interest in acquiring NH. Not only did the IFC lob-
by for the sale to LNM, seeing LNM as the guarantor of its loan repayment, but the 
idea also pleased the NH trade union, which preferred the sale to a strategic foreign 
investor to efforts at domestically-led restructuring.66 Above all, a quick privatiza-
tion deal meant that the negotiations concerning the competition chapter and state 
aid with the EU could be closed. After granting exclusivity to LNM, the Czech go-
vernment approved its bid on May 29, 2002, thereby opening the way for the closure 
of the competition chapter negotiations with the Commission.67 
Poland - Polskie Huty Stali S.A. - Mittal Steel Poland 
Of the cases considered, the Polish steel sector represents the purest example of EU 
influence, summed up in the words of one interviewed civil servant as "a pistol held 
to our head."68 Unlike the Czech and Slovak cases, the largest Polish steel produ-
cers, Katowice Steelworks (HK) and Tadeusz Sendzimir Steelworks (HTS) re-
mained exclusively in state hands, with privatization to foreign, rather than domes-
tic, investors considered as the natural alternative. 69 The management and the unions 
of these enterprises resisted merger efforts, as well as the sectoral consolidation idea 
more generally, suggested in the early 1990s in order to alleviate the effects of the 
Polish steel industry's atomization. They preferred individual restructuring routes in-
stead. There was no strong support for privatization within the industry or the 
64 Osinek was originally created to deliver inputs to VS and to coordinate its sales when the com-
pany faced the threat of bankruptcy. See:.Bouc 2001. 
65 Bouc 2002. 
66 Falcnikova 2002; Smid 2002; Interview with NH union leader, Ostrava, March 2004. 
67 The deal entailed the sum of $797m or 26.3b Kc, out of which 15.3b Kc was in assumed debt, 
8.2b Kc in capital investments and other contributions and 2.8b Kc for the purchase of shares. 
See: Beckwith 2002. 
68 Interview at the Ministry of State Treasury, Warsaw, July 2003. The sentiment was echoed in 
numerous other interviews. 
69 In fact, the first significant privatization to foreign investors in the steel sector in the region 
was the 1992 sale of W arszawa Steelworks to the Lucchini group. 
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government and several attempts to privatize the major enterprises to foreign invest-
tors in the second half of the 1990s failed. The reasons for these failures were as 
follows: insufficient extent of restructuring, especially as far as employment was 
concerned; uncertainty concerning the future of the two largest enterprises, which, 
according to most observers, should have been merged; as well as insufficient go-
vernment involvement and coordination of the privatization deals.70 
At the same time, for reasons encountered in the earlier case studies, the retaining of 
the status quo presented the government with high payoffs. Prior to the signing of 
the sectoral social pact on employment restructuring at the end of 1998, the govern-
ment's indecision regarding privatization averted any political fallout that could en-
sue from insider opposition to employment cuts that were bound to accompany pri-
vatization or radical restructuring. Secondly, the idea of "preserving social peace" 
served as a convenient excuse for the interests involved in the compensation arran-
gements among the enterprises, their intermediaries, and their subsidiaries, some of 
which were tied to the state apparatus.71 Thirdly, the government profited from pa-
tronage opportunities at its disposal, in the form of lucrative seats on enterprise su-
pervisory boards. The enterprises were shielded by the consecutive governments in 
power as the state apparatus became involved in resolving disputes between the steel 
mills and their creditors, most often other SOEs, thereby averting the danger of 
bankruptcy. These debt workouts _were an occasion for the adoption of restructuring 
plans, which for a limited amount of time improved the operation of the enterpris-
es. 72 Thus, the domestic market pressures were of non-trivial, though limited, signi-
ficance. Polish "latent statism" also displayed itself in the form of partially success-
ful pressures on the EU to grant derogations from the 1999 full liberalization of 
trade in steel products. 73 All along, however, the EU was making it clear that it re-
quired a sectoral restructuring plan as a condition for the permission to grant state 
aid, even if retroactively. , 
Similarly to the Czech case, the Commission rejected the initial 1998 program pro-
posal submitted by the government. One of the main criticisms was that it preserved 
too much production capacity. The preparations of the subsequent sectoral program 
stalled, as privatization negotiations concerning HK proceeded. Taking a hands-off 
approach, the Minister of State Treasury, in charge of privatization, delegated the re-
70 The criticism of the successive governments' policies toward the sector has been widespread. 
See, for example, the 2003 report by the Supreme Chamber of Control: Najwyzsza Izba 
Kontroli 2003. 
71 Interview with Edward Nowak, former Deputy Minister of the Economy, Krakow, July 2003; 
Interview at the Ministry of State Treasury, July 2003. 
72 For examples, see Cieszewska 2001a and 200lb. 
73 As a result, full liberalization was moved by one year and the relevant duty amounts reschedu-
led. See: Muitko 1999. 
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sponsibility for these negotiations to the management of HK. When these proved un-
suc-cessful late in 2000, the government found itself with a sector in a dire financial 
situation, and in need of a solution which would both solve the sector's problems 
and be acceptable to the EU. 74 A solution was seen in a coordinated approach, 
whereby renewed privatization effort would be coupled with sectoral consolidation. 
Reviving the merger idea, the privatization offer involved the combined sale of HK 
and HTS, along with Florian Steelworks and Cedler Steelworks. The latter two were 
considered to be small but valuable ''jewels" of the Polish steel industry.75 At the 
same time, as a back-up, a sectoral consolidation plan was being developed by the 
Deputy Minister of the Economy. A merger was to bring together these four enter-
prises, representing altogether 70% of total Polish steel production. The privatization 
raised significant interest, includeing from LNM and U.S. Steel. This was in notable 
contrast to the case of Sidex, where LNM was the only serious candidate and to the 
Czech privatization, which took place without a tender. The advanced four-fold pri-
vatization talks, however, were scrapped with the change of government following 
the September 2001 elections. 
The new government, a coalition dominated by the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), 
the communist successor party, decided to postpone the privatization process. It de-
cided first to engage in sectoral consolidation outlined by its predecessors and there-
fore created Polish Steelworks (PHS) in December of2002. It was clear that privati-
zation would be the only means of bringing about the viability of the enterprises. 
After all, state aid could not be used for new investments and given the heavy indeb-
tedness of PHS, it would have been unable to generate these funds internally or 
through the market. Yet, the government seemed to be postponing the privatization 
decision as long as it possibly could, to the dismay of the enterprise-level trade 
unions, which vented their frustration in a letter to the Minister of State Treasury.76 
Procrastination also plagued the creation of the sectoral plan. Prior to the Copenha-
gen summit, when the EU accession negotiations were to be finalized, the enterprise 
managers, the government, and the Commission engaged in an intensive shuttling of 
the sectoral program drafts between Brussels and Warsaw. The Commission, dis-
satisfied with individual steel mills' proposals for restructuring, threatened not to 
close the competition chapter if these were not corrected. In the end, the chapter was 
signed based on a draft version of the sectoral plan, finalized only in March 2003. At 
that point, the final privatization drive," which ended in October 2003 with privatiza-
tion to the ubiquitous LNM Group, was only beginning. The government, however, 
knew that the rules of the game were clear: it could only grant the negotiated state 
74 Bielecki 2000; Interview with Nowak, July 2003. 
75 Sznajder 2003. 
76 The enterprise-level unions sent a letter dated 13 June 13 2003, claiming that they had been 
awaiting the privatization decision for months and that the government's indecision jeopardi-
zed their enterprise's future. Letter on file with the author. 
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aid to the sector until the end of 2003, thus, all the negotiations pertaining to the fi-
nancial domain had to be finalized by that date.77 The "pistol held to our head" refer-
red to at the outset of this case study, took precisely the form of prohibition on state 
aid. 
V. Conclusion 
The three puzzles concerning the privatization of the steel industry to strategic for-
eign investors can be answered after we recognize that far from being a purely tech-
nocratic project, economic reform is subject to the vagaries of the political process. 
The case studies taken from the steel sector have shown that throughout the transi-
tion period, for reasons of political opportunism and personal benefit, it had been 
convenient for the successive governments in power to retain the partial reform sta-
tus quo. The latter either took the form of continued state ownership or of sales to 
non-strategic domestic investors. The eventual surprising convergence on a single 
property form, i.e., ownership by strategic foreign investors, has occurred as a result 
of external coercive pressures. Their role has all too frequently been neglected by 
transition literature analyzing the politics of restructuring and privatization. On the 
other hand, in focusing on EU effects, the Europeanization/EU enlargement litera-
ture has had a tendency to overlook other external pressures operating in the region, 
as well as the domestic institutions which mediate them. 
The presented case studies have shown that out of the four EU accession states con-
sidered, the EU coercive pressures were indeed critical in Poland and in the Czech 
Republic, the "transition leaders." At the same time, these two states were able to re-
tain the partial reform status quo longer than their Slovak and Romanian counter-
parts only because they were better able to shield their enterprises from the coercive 
effects of the global financial markets or the IFis. In comparison with Romania, the-
se states were far less reliant on external financing from the IFls. In comparison with 
Slovakia, they also served as explicit and implicit guarantor of the loans as far as the 
international financial market actors were concerned. Moreover, state involvement 
in the restructuring process of the individual enterprises was capable of bringing 
about partial adjustment to the market conditions. 
One could generalize by saying that the EU pressure is the most fine-tuned of the 
external pressures. It becomes most powerful in case of states capable of shielding 
77 The privatization contract totaled almost $2b for 60% of PHS S.A. shares (7. 7b PLN). LNM 
was to pay 621m PLN for enterprise debts to its principal creditors, which were the SOEs; 
370m PLN for debts to Agency for Industrial Development; 800m PLN to increase enterprise 
capital; 6m PLN in share purchase; 300m PLN as a working capital loan; 2.4b PLN in guaran-
teed investments, and 3.4b PLN in debt repayments. See: Stal 2003. 
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the enterprises from both market and institutional global pressures, yet not capable 
enough to bring about complete restructuring and market adjustment meeting the 
market viability standards of the EU. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the EU re-
mains vigilant after the enlargement, with the Commission keeping a watchful eye 
on any remaining ties between the state and economic actors. Its recent investiga-
tions of the Czech and Polish governments' creative efforts to provide state aid to 
other private and state-owned steelmakers, respectively, are a case in point.78 
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